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Abstract
Proactive password checkers have been widely used to persuade users to select stronger passwords by
providing machine-generated strength ratings of passwords. If such ratings do not match human-generated
ratings of human users, there can be a loss of trust in PPCs. In order to study the effectiveness of PPCs, it
would be useful to investigate how human users perceive such machine- and human-generated ratings in
terms of their trust, which has been rarely studied in the literature. To fill this gap, we report a large-scale
crowdsourcing study with over 1,000 workers. The participants were asked to choose which of the two ratings
they trusted more. The passwords were selected based on a survey of over 100 human password experts. The
results revealed that participants exhibited four distinct behavioral patterns when the passwords were hidden,
and many changed their behaviors significantly after the passwords were disclosed, suggesting their reported
trust was influenced by their own judgments.
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1. Introduction
Passwords have been dominating user authentication
for more than half a century and many researchers
believe that they will continue to represent a key
part of user authentication in the foreseeable future,
although many security and usability problems have
been identified and a lot of new user authentication
systems have been proposed over the years [1, 2].
Security problems of passwords are often caused by
insecure behaviors of human users [1, 3, 4]. To help
users create stronger passwords, proactive password
checkers (PPCs), also called password (strength) meters
by some researchers, have been widely used to
encourage users to create stronger passwords by giving
users real-time feedback on password strength [5].
Some PPCs have been found to be effective in leading
to stronger passwords in some scenarios [6, 7].
∗Corresponding co-authors. Contact them via: Saeed Ibrahim
Alqahtani – siqahtani@taibahu.edu.sa, Shujun Li – http://www.
hooklee.com/.
All PPCs show a strength rating when a given
password is entered by the user. Most widely used
PPCs are based on simple heuristic approaches (i.e.,
password length and composition) to rate a password’s
strength [6]. The strength rating is either a categorical
value such as “weak”, “medium” or “strong” [8], or
a numeric value such as an estimate of the password
entropy [9], or the estimated guess number/time for the
password being cracked [10].
More advanced PPCs are based on probabilistic
or machine learning techniques in measuring a
password’s security against attacks. Examples include
PPCs based on Markov models [11, 12], probabilistic
context-free grammars [10, 13, 14] (PFCG), and
neural networks [15]. Some researchers [16, 17] also
looked at combining various heuristic and probabilistic
approaches to design PPCs.
A special class of PPCs show the so-called peer
pressure motivator (PPM), an estimate of a password’s
strength relative to the whole set of passwords chosen
by all users [6, 18, 19]. Another recent development is
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a generalization of the concept of PPCs to a general-
purpose Password Security Visualizer (PSV) reported
in [20]. The PSV can be seen as a box of multiple parallel
PPCs and other password information units, which are
used together to inform users about different aspects of
password security.
Strength ratings of passwords can be classified
into machine-generated and human-generated ratings
according to the extent of the direct human involve-
ment in the strength evaluation, although the distinc-
tion between the two classifications can be more com-
plicated. In this paper, we use the following definitions:
1) a machine-generated rating is an automated objective
evaluation of password strength; 2) a human-generated
rating is a subjective evaluation of password strength.
Therefore, all strength ratings used in PPCs, regardless
of whether they have a closer link to human perception
of password strength, can be considered as machine-
generated ratings.
Although there is some evidence of the usefulness of
PPCs in motivating users to select stronger passwords,
how human users perceive machine-generated ratings
shown by PPCs and how such ratings influence
their behaviors remain largely unknown. This is
particularly problematic when the machine-generated
ratings contradict the human-generated judgments of
the users or what they heard from human experts.
Such a contradiction can potentially cause a loss of
user’s trust on the PPC concerned, so understanding
users’ trust in such ratings could provide useful insights
for the design and evaluation of PPCs and other
password security tools. The determinants of trust in
the human decision-making process have been studied
in various contexts [21, 22]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, they have not been systematically
investigated in the context of password research except
for some work [6, 23] that looked at user perception of
password security.
To fill this gap, we conducted a user study on
users’ trust in human- and machine-generated ratings
of password strength. Data collected from over 1,000
crowdsourcing workers revealed that: 1) user’s own
subjective perception of password strength could
heavily influence their perceived trust in human- and
machine-generated ratings of password strength; 2)
there are different user-specific behavioral patterns in
the reported trust in human- and machine-generated
ratings of password strength; 3) users’ trust in password
ratings could be password-dependent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents some related work. A detailed description of
our user study is given in Section 3, followed by data
analysis in Section 4 and more discussions of the above
four main findings in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 present
limitations of this study and future work, respectively.
The last section concludes the paper.
2. Related Work2.1. Role of Trustworthiness
Trust in PPCs can be important in predicting to
what extent PPCs will affect human users’ decision
making processes. Huang et al. [24] indicated that low
perceived security may cause users to reject the use of
IT system, while high perceived security may result in
engaging insecure practices. This would imply that risk
perception, which can be related to trust, can greatly
affect users’ decisions and behaviors. To the best of
our knowledge, no research has investigated the effect
of trust in human decision making in the context of
password ratings.
However, in social sciences, trust is often defined as
an individual’s readiness for a vulnerable circumstance
as a result of a positive expectation of others’
actions [22], where “others” can be other people or
automated systems. It is a general understanding that
the interpretation of trust is context-dependent and
research on it requires a multi-dimensional approach
in the right context [25]. On the other hand, social
psychological research has shown that individuals can
infer a person’s trustworthiness from a face in as fast as
100 ms [26]. In addition, trustworthiness is a morality-
related personality trait, and previous work has shown
that morality plays a primary role in social perception
and social judgment [27–29].
Researchers have often attributed trust to three
factors of a trustee: 1) expertise/ability (i.e., the degree
to which a trustee is believed to be competent), 2)
trustworthiness (i.e., the extent to which a trustee is
believed to be cooperative and kind), 3) honesty (i.e.,
the degree to which a trustee is believed to have
integrity) [22, 30]. Trust is also subject to other factors
related to personality traits and conditional reasons [21,
22, 25]. Toma’s study reported several cues linked to
perceived trustworthiness in Facebook profiles [31].
2.2. User Perception of PPCs
Few studies have focused on users’ perceptions
of password strength, but some work looked at
user perception around the use of PPCs. Ur et
al. [6] conducted a large-scale user study with
2,931 crowdsourcing participants and 14 PPCs to
collect participants’ opinions on the influence of
PPCs in creating passwords. The study showed that
more stringent PPCs performed better in influencing
users to create stronger passwords, but they also
caused more complaints. Some participants expressed
disagreements, surprises and even anger as a reaction
to machine-generated ratings of some conservative
PPCs. Participants’ prior experiences usually had an
impact on their impressions of password strength,
particularly when they contravene their expectations.
2 EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
Human-Generated and Machine-Generated Ratings of Password Strength
A similar finding was also reported in [20], where a
semi-structured interview study on password security
showed that users trust PPCs in some situations
especially when a PPC reports password strength that
matches their expectations.
In another work conducted by Egelman et al. [7],
two different PPCs were tested with real passwords
used by participants in a lab setting and a field
experiment. It was observed that the mere presence
of a PPC could influence users to create stronger
passwords. This work also led to another observation
that participants knowingly chose weak passwords
for unimportant accounts, which implies that users’
subjective judgments on password strength did play a
role in their decision-making process.
Sotirakopoulos et al. [18, 19] proposed a PPC
design based on a peer pressure motivator (PPM).
They conducted user studies to verify if PPM worked,
and mixed results emerged: the PPM-based PPC
did influence users positively compared with the
case without any PPC, but it did not make any
significant difference compared with other non-PPM
PPCs. Egelman et al. got a similar finding in terms of
its effectiveness [7].
Some research has focused on understanding the
password creation process from the user’s perspective.
Ur et al. [32] conducted a qualitative user study aiming
to understand common password patterns as well as
investigating users’ perception of password strength
using a think-aloud and role-playing approach. They
observed that although most users have a well-defined
password creation strategy, some misconceptions about
password strength (e.g., adding a digit or a special
character to the end of a password makes it secure)
could result in creating weak passwords. Furthermore,
the misunderstanding of security advice can also cause
misconceptions around password strength.
Other research has focused on understanding the
users’ perception of password strength suggesting
that participants had serious misconceptions on how
to make strong passwords, although in some other
cases their perceptions of strong passwords matched
password measures [23, 33]. A large variance in
participants’ understanding of password cracking
methods was observed in [33], which suggests that
human judgments on password strength are likely to be
user-specific. Seitz and Hussmann [23] also suggested
personalization as an effective motivator to secure
behaviors.
2.3. Impact of Human/Machine-Generated Feedbackon Decision Making
To the best of our knowledge, there is only limited
research investigating the impact of human-generated
ratings/feedback and machine-generated ratings on the
human decision-making process, mostly in the health
care, business and marketing literature. For instance,
Lynn [34] found that a subjective message about the rise
of venereal disease was trusted more than an objective
message. Darley and Smith [35] investigated the effect
of message board persuasion in terms of subjective
messages and/or objective messages in marketing
research. The use of objective messages was shown to
be more effective than subjective messages, but the
effectiveness of combining both types of messages did
not differ significantly from the case of using one
type of messages alone. They concluded that conditions
and the context are more important factors to be
considered. Research has also shown that people are
averse to rely on algorithms and they opt for human
judgments instead, a phenomenon known as algorithm
aversion [36].
The most closely-related work in the cyber security
area is from Chen et al. [37]. They conducted a user
study to examine the impact of risk (negative) and
safety (positive) information summaries of mobile apps
on participants’ decisions to install apps. Their results
imply that developing a valid risk/safety index for
mobile apps could potentially improve users’ app-
installation decisions, especially when this information
is framed in terms of safety. Chong et. al. [38] managed
to replicate the findings from Chen et al. when they
study the influence of privacy priming and security
framing on Android App selection. Yet, they proved
there is a greater effect by scores framed as safety
instead of risk.
3. User Study Design
As users’ trust can be important in predicting to
what extent people rely on PPCs to make decisions
about password choices, our work focuses on the effect
of trust on human decision-making in the context
of password ratings (what is trusted more: machine-
generated, human-generated or user’s own judgment of
password security). In other words, our work examines
the question of what the most trusted evaluation
source of password strength is: “machine-generated”, or
“human-generated” evaluation of password security, or
their own judgment.
3.1. Hypotheses
The user study was designed to investigate users’ trust
in human-generated and machine-generated ratings of
password strength. Our expectation was that users’
trust (i.e., self-reported) in human-generated and
machine-generated ratings of password strength would
depend on several factors. Some of these factors can
be linked directly to human factors such as users’
experience and characteristics, or to non-human factors
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such as the password structure, and the type of
feedback given (human/machine-generated).
We formulated four hypotheses: H1) users’ own
subjective judgment on password strength plays a
significant role in users’ self-reported trust in human-
generated and machine-generated ratings; H2) users’
self-reported trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings is user specific; H3) users’ self-
reported trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings is password-dependent; H4) some
demographic factors play a significant role in users’
self-reported trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings.
3.2. Procedure
To test the above hypotheses, we conducted a within-
subjects crowdsourcing user study. At the beginning
of the user study, a brief overview was given to
each participant explaining the meanings of human-
generated and machine-generated “objective” ratings.
The study was designed to be completed within 30
minutes. The study was structured in three sessions.1
Participants’ demographics including age, gender, and
their computer skill levels were collected in the first
session. In the next two sessions, six passwords with
their realistic human-generated and machine-generated
ratings (see Table 1) were presented to participants
in two different conditions: 1) “hidden” – passwords
shown as eight2 asterisks; 2) “displayed” – passwords
shown in clear (see Fig. 1). Passwords’ ratings in
both sessions are shown in clear. Having the two
sessions allowed us to test Hypothesis H1 as disclosing
passwords would give users new information to make
their own judgment on the strength of each password,
therefore influencing their perception of the human-
generated and machine-generated ratings. For each
password, participants were asked which password
rating (“subjective” or “objective”) they trusted more.
They could also choose two other options ( “neither”
or “undecided”) if they trusted neither or if they could
not decide. Figure 1 shows example screenshots of
questions we asked our participants.
All passwords with their ratings were presented to
participants in the same order as shown in Table 1.
We did not randomize the order for two reasons: 1) to
get a complete randomization of password orders, this
1In our user study, we actually included three more sessions on
privacy ratings of mobile apps for a different study. Participants were
randomly divided into two groups, one was asked to do the password
tasks first and the other the mobile app tasks first. Our analysis
showed that the data from both groups were consistent so we used
all participants for our data analysis reported in this paper.
2Fixing the length of hidden passwords is for controlling the effect of
passwords length on participants’ decisions on which rating is better
than the other.
(a) Hidden passwords
(b) Displayed passwords
Figure 1. Screenshots of hidden and displayed passwordquestions and rating options.
Table 1. Six passwords used in our experiments and theirstrength ratings, shown in 5-point scale (Very Weak, Weak,Medium, Good, Very Good).
ID Password machine human
-generated -generated
PW1 Q2W3E4R5 Weak Very Weak
PW2 a9vojebafe37 Very Good Good
PW3 St3v3J0b$Dropbox Very Good Weak
PW4 heart of darkness Good Weak
PW5 p@$$vv0rd Medium Very Weak
PW6 aAaAaAaA Very Weak Very Weak
would have required a larger sample size of participants
and additional costs could be avoided if the password
order is fixed; 2) the results of a separate smaller user
study indicated that the password order did not have
any significant effect, supporting our decision to use a
fixed order of passwords in the main experiment. This
smaller user study involved 240 participants assigned
to four groups (60 participants per group) and the six
passwords with their ratings in each group were shown
in different order. In Group 1, passwords were shown
in a random order as shown in Table 1. In Group 2,
passwords were arranged based on their strength (from
the weakest to the strongest) and the order in Group 3
was reversed. In Group 4, passwords were arranged to
have weak and strong passwords alternately. Then, we
ran a multinomial regression analysis on the collected
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data which showed that there were no significant
differences between the groups except between Groups
1 and 2.
We also ran another multinomial regression test
comparing the data of the 240 participants collected
from the smaller user study with the data of 240
participants who were randomly sampled from the
main experiment where all passwords were shown on a
fixed order. The multinomial regression results showed
no significant differences between the two groups (χ2 =
4.1955, p < 0.24111, McFadden R2 = 0.000301).
The six passwords and their human-generated
ratings shown to participants were determined based
on an online survey of over one hundred cyber
security experts recruited from different channels (see
Section 3.3 for more details). We used experts rather
than average users because we believe that the former
group has more knowledge needed to make appropriate
judgments on password strength [39]. The machine-
generated ratings of the passwords were obtained from
the widely used PPC zxcvbn [40]. Participants were
told that human-generated ratings were generated by
a group of security experts while machine-generated
“objective” ratings were generated by a computer
algorithm developed by a group of security experts. Our
aim was to use a neutral language to avoid wording that
could influence participants’ answers.
After each participant finished answering one
question, a follow-up question was asked for the
participant to select the reason of his/her answer out
of a list of pre-defined options plus a free-format
text area for additional information. We collected this
information to have a better understanding of how
participants made their decisions. To minimize the
potential influence of the order of answer options in
each question, we randomized the order of answer
options so that each specific order got an equal number
of participants.
As in typical crowdsourcing user studies, we did not
collect any personal data or sensitive data. The user
study was reviewed by our University Ethics Committee
(UEC) and a favorable ethics opinion was secured
before we started the user study.
3.3. Passwords and Ratings Determination
We decided to use only six passwords to keep
participants workload light. To reduce password
selection biases, the six passwords were selected from
a larger set of 21 passwords, which were studied in
an online survey on those passwords’ strength and
categorization. The 21 passwords were chosen from a
wide range of password categories and complexity (e.g.,
common passwords, alternation to common passwords,
personal-based passwords, and random passwords).
The survey was published through a number of
cyber security channels (the Openwall password
(http://openwall.com/lists/passwords) and NCC
Group mailing lists, the cyber security community
on Freenode (http://irc.freenode.net) and Twitter).
It also collected self-reported basic demographic
information to exclude non-expert participants.
In total, 110 (self-recognized) password experts took
our survey. Figure 2 shows the level of experience and
education of all participants. Most of the 21 passwords
were rated by all experts, but password categories
received fewer answers, suggesting that some experts
had difficulties in making decisions on the best category
for some passwords. Interestingly, the passwords’
human-generated ratings collected from human experts
had a general tendency to be more conservative than
the corresponding machine-generated ratings given
by a state-of-the-art PPC zxcvbn [40]. This could
represent a bias in the machine-generated and human-
generated password strength as the difference between
human-generated and machine-generated ratings used
could influence users’ perceived trust in such ratings.
However, we decided to trade off this bias against the
ecological validity of our password samples. Further
research on experts’ perception of password strength
is required to clarify how human-generated password
ratings could be collected and used in a different
fashion.
> 20 years
16%
10-20 years
29%
5-10 years
21%
2-5 years
22% < 2 years
12%
(a) Level of Experience
PhD degree
10%
Master’s degree
37.3%
Bachelor’s degree
35.5%
Others
17.3%
(b) Level of Education
Figure 2. Demographics of experts recruited.
From the 21 passwords we selected six based on
two criteria: 1) ensuring distinct levels of password
structure and complexity, and thus different levels of
guessing effort so that we could test hypothesis H3; 2)
ensuring a relatively wide range of human-generated
and machine-generated ratings while keeping the
participants’ overall task light to avoid biases due to
fatigue.
According to the selection criteria, the six passwords
shown in Table 1 were selected from three major
password categories commonly used in real-world
scenarios: 1) “word password”: a string that consists of
one or more common words with or without character
transformation; 2) “non-word password”: a string that
is based on keyboard patterns or repeated patterns and
do not contains any words; 3) “mixture password”:
a more complicated string that can be segmented
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into different segments of different category. We also
selected the six passwords so that they all had distinct
human/machine-generated rating combinations, which
also helped us conduct the analysis on password
dependency of users’ reported trust in human-
generated and machine-generated ratings.
The selected six passwords shown in Table 1
represent three major categories of passwords human
users often use in real-world scenarios: 1) dictionary-
based passwords (i.e., “p@$$vv0rd”) and pass-phases
(i.e., “heart of darkness”); 2) passwords formed
based on keyboard patterns (i.e., “Q2W3E4R5”) and a
repeated structure (“aAaAaAaA”); 3) passwords formed
based on hybrid rules (i.e., “St3v3J0b$Dropbox”) and
random characters (i.e., “a9vojebafe37”).
In terms of human-generated ratings, we decided to
use the median of all experts’ reported ratings as the
human-generated ratings used in our user study. In the
case that the median rating lay exactly between two
ratings (e.g., for the median value 0.5, both 0 (“very
weak”) and 1 (“weak”) are equally distant from the
median value), we selected the rating receiving more
votes. We managed to decide the ratings of all the six
passwords following these two rules.
3.4. Participant Recruitment
The crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower3 was used
to recruit participants. Each participant was rewarded
$0.6 for the whole study (including the mobile app
tasks not covered in this paper). We decided the price
of $0.6 based on similar tasks on the same platform to
avoid under- or over-motivate participation. Note that
on crowdsourcing platforms rewards for such micro
tasks are mostly very cheap.
We recruited only the most trusted workers rated by
CrowdFlower (i.e., the “Level 3” workers) to maximize
data quality. We also split the whole user study into a
number of parts and ran them on different days and
at different times to recruit participants from a wider
spectrum in terms of geo-locations and working times.
4. Results
In total 1,100 participants took part in our user
study. 23 participants were excluded because they
took the experiment more than once. Therefore, the
data we analyzed were based on 1, 100 − 23 = 1, 077
participants from 68 countries. The male-female ratio
was 66% to 34%. The participants had a reasonably
wide age range: 26-35 (39.4%), 18-25 (30.6%), 36-45
(20.8%), over 45 (8.6%), and below 18 (0.6%). Due to
the relatively small number of participants in the last
3Renamed to “Figure Eight” (https://www.figure-eight.com/) in
2018.
(a) Hidden passwords
(b) Displayed passwords
Figure 3. 2-D histograms of participant’s collective behaviors forchoosing “su” and “ob”.
two age groups, we re-grouped participants to have a
more even distribution: 25 or below (336 participants),
26-35 (424 participants), 36 or older (317 participants).
Next, we report the main results of our user study. For
the four answer options for each password, we define
2-character short names: “su” for “human-generated
rating”, “ob” for “machine-generated rating”, “ne” for
“neither”, and “ud” for “undecided”.
4.1. Behavioral Analysis: Password Condition
First, we report the impact of the password display
condition (“Hidden” or “Displayed”, as a binary
variable) on participants’ self-reported trust in human-
generated and machine-generated ratings. Here, the
dependent variable is the 4-valued answer of each
participant (i.e., the self-reported trust). Among the
four values, we are more interested in “su” and
“ob”, but also examine “ne” and “ud” since they can
reveal how participants felt about the shown human-
generated and machine-generated ratings.
In order to visualize all participants’ collective
behavior, we produced 2-D histograms of participants’
behavioral patterns for both “Hidden” and “Displayed”
conditions as shown in Fig. 3, where the 2-D bin at
position (i, j) indicates the number of participants who
chose “su” i times and “ob” j times (0 ≤ i + j ≤ 6). The
maximum value of i + j is 6 because the sum cannot
6 EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
Human-Generated and Machine-Generated Ratings of Password Strength
exceed the number of passwords shown to participants,
which is 6.
From Fig. 3, we can visually observe that the
participants’ collective behavior was affected by the
password display condition. When the passwords were
hidden, most participants tended to follow one of four
typical behaviors (i.e., four peaks in the 2-D histogram
– see Section 4.2). However, once the passwords were
disclosed, the majority of participants changed their
choices for at least one password so that the shape of
the 2-D histogram changed drastically with much less
clear peaks.
For participants who reported full trust in either
machine-generated or human-generated ratings (95
and 73), 39% of them (30 out of 73 participants
who had full trust in human-generated rating and
35 out of 95 participants who fully trusted machine-
generated rating) changed their reported trust for at
least one password, leading to a much flatter histogram.
It deserves noting that around 3% (32/1077) of the
participants reported trust in neither human-generated
nor machine-generated ratings in both conditions,
suggesting that some human users may have an
intrinsic disbelief on ratings given by others (regardless
of whether the sources are machines or other people).
Although the differences between the two 2-D
histograms are clearly visible, we applied Stuart-
Maxwell χ2 tests (with a degree of freedom of 3 because
the dependent variable has 4 values) and a multinomial
regression to test if the differences were statistically
significant.
The Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests showed that the
observed difference was indeed statistically significant
as seen in Table 2.4 However, the multinomial
regression results in Table 3 show a low McFadden’s R2
value, suggesting that the condition as a binary variable
did not have a good predictive power so the differences
were better tested by other statistical tests (i.e., Stuart-
Maxwell χ2 test). In the table, each row represents a
linear prediction model ln
(
p(y)
p(ob)
)
= βy0 + βy1 × x, where
the predictor variable x is the display condition (1 =
display, 0 = hidden), the predicted variable is ln
(
p(y)
p(ob)
)
,
and y ∈ {su,ne,ud}.
4.2. Behavioral Analysis: Behavioral Pattern
As we mentioned before, in Fig. 3(a) we can observe four
peaks, each referring to a different behavioral pattern.
This seems to suggest that each participant had some
intrinsic behavioral style that could influence their
4For p-value, “< ε” means that the exact p-value could not be obtained
but it drops below the precision limit (which is 2.22 × 10−16 for R, the
language we used for statistical tests). The same notation will be used
for other tables throughout this paper.
Table 2. Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests for analyzingparticipants’ self-reported trust in machine-generated andhuman-generated ratings.
Distributions Compared χ2 p-value
su (Hidden) vs. su (Displayed) 46.079 2.86 × 10−8
ob (Hidden) vs. ob (Displayed) 98.349 2.20 × 10−16
su (Hidden) vs. ob (Hidden) 49.051 7.28 × 10−9
su (Displayed) vs. ob (Displayed) 120.29 < ε
Table 3. Results of the multinomial logistic regressionsconducted on the password display condition as the predictorof participants’ self-reported trust.
Predictor Option b SE p-value OR
Displayed su -0.15 0.04 1.9 × 10−4 0.858
Displayed ne -0.01 0.06 0.92 0.995
Displayed ud -0.49 0.06 < ε 0.614
χ2 = 78.841 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.002. The baseline of the
independent variable (password display condition) is “Hidden”.
self-reported trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings. Therefore, by knowing which behav-
ioral style a person had, his/her trust in human-
generated and machine-generated password ratings
could be predicted which allowed us to test H2. There-
fore, we ran a k-means algorithm to cluster all par-
ticipants of our user study into four behavioral clus-
ters: P1 (human-generated rating believer, 220 par-
ticipants, centre={5,3}), P2 (machine-generated rating
believer, 410 participants, centre={0.5,4.6}), P3 (bal-
anced believer, 242 participants, centre={2.9,2.2}) and
P4 (disbeliever, 205 participants, centre={0.7,0.9}.
We conducted another multinomial logistic regres-
sion using the behavioral cluster of each participant
obtained from the k-means clustering. This regression
evaluates whether the behavioral cluster label is a good
predictor of participants’ perceived trust. The results
are depicted in Table 4, which indicate that the overall
effect is statistically significant with mostly significant
odds ratios. The results show that human-generated rat-
ing believers (P1) and balanced believers (P3) are more
likely to select human-generated ratings over machine-
generated ratings compared to the disbelievers (P4).
The odds ratio of (P1) shows that human-generated rat-
ing believers are predicted to select human-generated
ratings over machine-generated ratings more than those
who belong to the other behavioral styles.
The above analysis may be seen as circular reasoning
as the personality labels are obtained from the data
and then used to predict the data. To further validate
whether the personality labels obtained from running
the k-means clustering are reliable, we ran a new
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Table 4. Results of the multinomial logistic regression conductedon the behavioral pattern as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust.
Predictor Option b SE p-value OR
P1 su 1.69 0.08 < ε 5.392
P1 ne -1.35 0.12 < ε 0.259
P1 ud -1.19 0.1 < ε 0.305
P2 su -1.5 0.08 < ε 0.222
P2 ne -1.94 0.07 < ε 0.143
P2 ud -2.72 0.08 < ε 0.066
P3 su 0.31 0.08 3.54 × 10−5 1.367
P3 ne -1.55 0.09 < ε 0.212
P3 ud -2.04 0.09 < ε 0.131
χ2 = 4576.1 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.1428. The baseline of the
independent variable is “P4”.
analysis where we split the data into two non-
overlapping subsets, as can be see at Table 5. Each
subset contained users responses on a different subset
of three passwords. Then, we ran k-means clustering
algorithm on each data subset to derive the personality
label for each participant and then used the label as
an independent variable to predict the reported trust
in the other subset. Next, we conducted a multinomial
regression on each data subset. The results showed
that the odds ratios observed in the new analysis
were aligned with the finding in the first analysis,
indicating that most users behave consistently for
different passwords in how they reported their trust in
human-generated and machine-generated ratings.
We were also interested in the behavioral changes
of participants with different behavioral patterns when
the password display condition changed from “Hidden”
to “Displayed”. Figure 4 shows a comparison between
the distribution of users’ responses in terms of their
choices on “su” and “ob” for the four behavioral
patterns. There are four green sub-figures, each refers
to a particular behavioral group style (P1, P2, P3, or P4)
and highlights the distribution of users’ responses when
passwords were hidden. The number of participants
in a particular behavioral group style is shown at
the top of the green sub-figure. The four yellow sub-
figures highlight how users with a particular behavioral
style changed their behaviors when passwords were
displayed. At the top of each sub-figure, the number
of participants who did not change their behavior
is highlighted in dark grey while the total number
of participants who completely shifted to another
behavioral style is highlighted in dark red. The number
of participants in each of the other behavioral styles was
highlighted in light red.
As a whole, 54% of participants (581/1077) changed
their reported trust. More than half (126/220, 57%) of
Table 5. Results of a multinomial logistic regression conductedon two password data subsets as the predictor of participants’self-reported trust.
(a) Model 1 based on Dataset 1
Predictor b p-value OR
P1:ot vs ob -1.210 2.32 × 10−10 0.298
P1:sb vs ob 1.619 < ε 5.050
P1:ud vs ob -0.305 0.024 0.737
P2:ot vs ob -1.198 < ε 0.302
P2:sb vs ob -0.807 < ε 0.446
P2:ud vs ob -1.683 < ε 0.186
P3:ot vs ob -0.996 1.13 × 10−12 0.369
P3:sb vs ob 0.508 2.41 × 10−7 1.663
P3:ud vs ob -0.884 1.76 × 10−12 0.413
a χ2 = 1357.5 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.082. The
dataset includes users responses on PW1, PW3,
and PW5.
b The baseline is “P4”. The reference of password
rating is “ob”.
(b) Model 2 based on Dataset 2
Predictor b p-value OR
P1:ot vs ob -1.204 1.41 × 10−6 0.300
P1:sb vs ob 1.044 < ε 2.841
P1:ud vs ob -2.280 1.54 × 10−12 0.102
P2:ot vs ob -1.034 < ε 0.356
P2:sb vs ob -1.449 < ε 0.235
P2:ud vs ob -2.011 < ε 0.134
P3:ot vs ob -0.851 3.13 × 10−12 0.427
P3:sb vs ob -0.325 2.14 × 10−4 0.722
P3:ud vs ob -1.809 < ε 0.164
a χ2 = 1217.5 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.078. The
dataset includes users responses on PW2, PW4,
and PW6.
b The baseline is “P4”. The reference of password
rating is “ob”.
human-generated rating believers (P1) changed their
reported trust for at least one password (see Fig. 4a).
Most of them (19%) had an extreme shift towards
trusting machine-generated ratings while a few of
them (5%) shifted to disbelievers. However, machine-
generated ratings believers (P2) seemed to have a
stronger view as they shifted only slightly towards
balanced believers or disbelievers, and only 8 (2%)
completely changed their positions (see Fig. 4(b)). For
balanced believers (P4), the behavioral change had
a wider distribution, whereby 87 (36%) participants
migrated to trust machine-generated ratings more
(see Fig. 4(c)). Finally, P4 had the similar behavioral
distribution as P3 but with low level of trust in human-
generated ratings (see Fig. 4(d)).
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P1 P2 P3 P4
P1 	  size 220 size 94 42 74 10 126
75% 33% 59% 8%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 3 11 9 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 7 13 8 0 0
3 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 6 12 13 0 0 0
4 17 32 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 10 23 0 0 0 0
5 44 37 0 0 0 0 0 5 23 13 0 0 0 0 0
6 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 43 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4
P2 	  size 410 size 8 295 81 26 115
6% 234% 64% 21%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 36 37 80 95 0 1 0 8 40 33 57 60
1 0 0 0 37 61 35 0 1 0 3 10 16 34 31 0
2 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 1 3 12 21 24 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 16 19 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 3 11 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4
P3 	  size 242 size 30 87 102 23 140
24% 69% 81% 18%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 6 8 3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7 15 18 9 0
2 0 0 39 38 0 0 0 2 0 11 12 20 20 0 0
3 0 26 55 40 0 0 0 3 1 12 19 26 0 0 0
4 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 13 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 13 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4
P4 	  size 205 size 9 45 61 90 115
7% 36% 48% 71%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 60 14 30 0 0 0 0 0 28 9 7 8 9 2 0
1 12 15 35 0 0 0 0 1 4 12 13 9 6 5 0
2 11 28 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 12 10 14 6 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 11 11 7 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 5 8 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ob ob
(	  a)	  Subjective	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  believers	  	  (P1)	  
(	  d)	  Disbelievers	  (	  P4	  )
(	  c)	  	  Balanced	  	  believers	  	  (P3)	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  b)	  	  Objectives	  rating	  believers	  	  (P2)	  
Displayed	  Passwords
su su
ob ob
su su
su su
ob ob
Hidden	  Passwords
ob ob
su su
Figure 4. 2-D distribution of participants’ responses accordingto behavioral patterns and password display conditions.
4.3. Behavioral Analysis: Demographic Factors
We conducted an additional multinomial logistic
regression to test the possible impact of demographic
factors including gender, age, and skill level on
participants’ trust. The results showed that the effect
was not significant (χ2 = 321.77, p < ε, McFadden R2 =
0.01, odds ratios are mostly not far from 1).
4.4. Behavioral Analysis: Password Dependencies
We also conducted a password-level analysis to see
if participants’ behaviors depended on an individual
password. Since the human-generated and machine-
generated ratings (and their difference) were dependent
on passwords, what we considered were actually both
the passwords and their ratings. If and how we can
Table 6. Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests on participants’perception of human-generated and machine-generated passwordratings for different passwords (“hidden” to “displayed”).
Predictor χ2 p-value
PW1(H) vs PW1(D) 54.9 7.2 × 10−12
PW2(H) vs PW2(D) 37.3 4.0 × 10−8
PW3(H) vs PW3(D) 293.6 < ε
PW4(H) vs PW4(D) 65.5 4.0 × 10−14
PW5(H) vs PW5(D) 32.8 3.5 × 10−7
PW6(H) vs PW6(D) 12.1 0.007
D: the displayed password condition; H:
the hidden password condition.
separate these two aspects remains an open question
for future studies (which most likely would require
fictitious ratings with the additional disadvantage
that they can be easily detected by participants).
As we aimed at studying the effect of password,
password dependency would refer to not only the
effect of password but to its own human-generated and
machine-generated rating. Since the value of password
strength ratings varies according to the concerned
password, we cannot study the effect of password
structure alone.
We used a Stuart-Maxwell χ2 test to see if the
distribution of responses’ shifted significantly when the
password changed, allowing us to test Hypothesis H3.
In Table 6, the results showed significant differences for
all passwords when the password display condition was
changed from “Hidden” to “Displayed”.
Table 7 shows a comparison between different
password pairs when passwords were displayed. A
number of Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests were used for
testing homogeneity for the four rating options
(“su”,“ob”,“ne” and “ud”). The results also showed
significant differences between different password
pairs, suggesting that users’ trust and decision-making
were password dependent.
We also conducted a multinomial regression to see
the predictive effect of the password on selecting either
human-generated or machine-generated ratings. We
chose PW6 (“aAaAaAaA”) as the baseline since among all
passwords it has the simplest structure and it had the
least influence on users’ trust in human-generated and
machine-generated ratings. The multinomial regression
results showed an overall significant difference between
different passwords (χ2 = 1072.2, p < ε, McFadden
R2 = 0.00033).
Table 8 shows significant differences for most of
passwords except PW1 (“Q2W3E4R5”) and PW4 (“heart
of darkness”) in terms of users’ reported trust
in human-generated ratings and machine-generated
ratings. The results showed that participants were more
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Table 7. Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests on participants’perception of human-generated and machine-generated passwordratings for different displayed password pairs. The p-valuesfor all cases are < ε except for two cases: “PW1 vs PW5”(p = 1.3 × 10−10) and “PW2 vs PW5” (p = 2.6 × 10−8).
Predictor χ2 Predictor χ2
PW1 vs PW2 130.3 PW1 vs PW3 242.5
PW1 vs PW4 125.8 PW1 vs PW5 49.0
PW1 vs PW6 132.4 PW2 vs PW3 233.1
PW2 vs PW4 101.1 PW2 vs PW5 38.2
PW2 vs PW6 328.0 PW3 vs PW4 390.3
PW3 vs PW5 205.8 PW3 vs PW6 361.4
PW4 vs PW5 103.4 PW4 vs PW6 299.1
PW5 vs PW6 227.6
likely to select machine-generated ratings over human-
generated ratings for PW2, PW3, PW5, in relation to
PW6. As a whole, we can conclude that users’ reported
trust was password dependent.
Table 8. Results of multinomial logistic regressions conductedon the displayed passwords as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust.
Predictor b p-value OR
PW1 su vs ob -0.052 0.514 0.950
ne vs ob -0.879 < ε 0.415
ud vs ob -1.378 < ε 0.252
PW2 su vs ob -0.209 0.007 0.811
ne vs ob -2.144 < ε 0.117
ud vs ob -1.676 < ε 0.187
PW3 su vs ob -0.485 7.79 × 10−10 0.616
ne vs ob -1.893 < ε 0.151
ud vs ob -1.616 < ε 0.199
PW4 su vs ob 0.148 0.056 1.159
ne vs ob -1.613 < ε 0.199
ud vs ob -1.283 < ε 0.277
PW5 su vs ob -0.252 0.001 0.777
ne vs ob -1.342 < ε 0.261
ud vs ob -1.421 < ε 0.242
χ2 = 1072.2 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.033459. The
baseline is PW6. The reference of password rating
is “ob”.
Furthermore, as shown by participants’ actual
responses on each rating option for all six passwords,
we found that participants’ reported trust was mostly
not password dependent when the passwords were
hidden, except for PW6. Participants had a nearly
uniform response among the four possible answers for
PW6. This can be explained in light of the fact that PW6
had the same human-generated and machine-generated
ratings, so participants made a random guess.
However, this was not the case when passwords
were displayed. It is obvious that displaying passwords
played a role in users’ perception of trust, which
led to very different responses among all participants
(likely driven by their different behavioral styles).
When the password complexity was not obvious to
users such as for PW3 (“St3v3J0b$Dropbox”) and
PW5 (“p@$$vv0rd”), machine-generated ratings were
more likely to be selected, unlike the case of PW4.
Interestingly, users’ perception of trust for PW6 did
not vary much, which could be attributed to the reason
explained above.
The above results can also be seen visually in
Figure 5, which shows percentages of participants’
answers for each of the four options and for all the
five passwords. Figure 5(a) shows that participants
had a convergence of views in terms of trust when
passwords were hidden. However, this is not the case
when passwords became clear as shown in Fig. 5(b). It
is obvious that displaying passwords played a role in
the users’ perception of trust. Both the above regression
tests and visual inspection of Fig. 5(b) lead to the same
observation that the five passwords can be put into two
groups: 1) PW1 and PW2 (more participants chose to
trust human-generated ratings); 2) PW3, PW4 and PW5
(more participants chose to trust machine-generated
ratings).
4.5. Users’ Self-Reported Reasons of Trust Choices
We also collected users’ self-reported reasons behind
their choices of trust (see Appendix A for a list of
predefined reasons depending on each user’s choice
of rating). In total, 16% of participants reported that
machine-generated ratings were trusted more readily as
they were generated by automated algorithms, which
can detect hidden things better than humans. 40%
of participants selected machine-generated or human-
generated ratings as they matched their expectations
while 10% of participants selected “neither” as none
of the ratings matched their expectations. 15% of those
who selected human-generated ratings were influenced
by their desire to be on the safer side, mainly because
human-generated ratings were more conservative than
machine-generated ratings. Interestingly, none of those
who selected human-generated ratings reported loss of
trust in machine-generated ratings, while some of those
who more readily trusted machine-generated ratings
reported a loss of trust in human-generated ratings.
5. Discussion
Our work compares users’ trust of password ratings
given by two rating sources (PPCs and human password
experts) thus providing an original contribution to the
literature, in particular with respect to Ur et al.’s work
[33]. This section expands on the interpretation of the
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Figure 5. Percentages of participants’ answers for all six passwords when they were hidden and displayed.
results, focusing on the four hypotheses we previously
explained in Section 3.1.
5.1. Contextual Effects
The password display condition had an influence
on users’ decision making. Our findings showed a
significant shift of the participants’ collective behavior
when password display condition changed, which
confirms our first hypothesis (H1). This would also
suggest that generalizing the results to different
contexts (i.e., the context of mobile apps’ ratings) might
also be possible.
In addition, participants tended to trust machine-
generated ratings more than human-generated ratings
when the passwords were hidden. The results also
showed that users’ own subjective judgments on
password strength played an active role in their trust
in both password ratings. This was more obvious when
passwords were displayed as the participants were
supplied with more information.
Many participants preferred their own judgments of
password strength when the passwords were disclosed.
This shows that some people would apply their rational
thinking to evaluate the trustworthiness of a trustee
(i.e., source of password ratings or password rating)
before placing trust.
We also observed that some participants were risk-
averse as they showed willingness to select the rating
that matched their expectations while some others had
a higher tendency to trust a trustee even when there
was not enough information. These behaviors can be
attributed to the strong impact of people’ behavioral
patterns on their trust perception.
5.2. Behavioral Patterns and Their Effects
Our experiment revealed the existence of different
behavioral patterns that had a significant impact on
users’ reported trust, providing support for hypothesis
H2. Some participants appeared to be conservative
and cautious when it came to trust a particular
type of password ratings. This is reflected in some
participants’ tendency towards selecting the lower,
more conservative ratings (i.e., choosing “Very Weak”
instead of “Weak”) to be on the safer side. This finding
suggests that password rating can also have an influence
on perceived trust.
Some other behavioral patterns can be associated
with trust bias. Participants who had an extreme trust in
either human-generated or machine-generated ratings
can be considered relatively risk-seeker. In contrast,
some participants seemed to be risk-averse as they
avoided trusting any rating in most cases, regardless of
the specific situation.
The effect of the behavioral patterns becomes less
obvious with displayed passwords. This may be
attributed to the fact that many participants based their
reported trust on their own subjective judgments on the
password strength, i.e., their behavioral style played a
less important role than their judgment).
5.3. Impact of Individual Password on User’s Trust
Our results showed that the password complexity
and structure had a clear-cut influence on users’
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reported trust (hypothesis H3). This was observable
when different displayed passwords received different
trust responses.
It seems that participants could easily make a
judgment when passwords had a simple structure
such as PW4 (“heart of darkness”), leading to select
human-generated ratings as they almost assigned lower
ratings to passwords. For more complicated pass-
words, i.e., PW1 (“Q2W3E4R5”), PW2 (“a9vojebafe37”),
PW3 (“St3v3J0b$Dropbox”) and PW5 (“p@$$vv0rd”),
machine-generated ratings were more likely to be
selected by human participants, which could be consid-
ered as indirect evidence that they had a good level of
trust in PPCs. For PW3 (“St3v3J0b$Dropbox”), which
had a complicated structure and a large difference
between its human-generated and machine-generated
ratings, users reported to trust the machine-generated
rating more than the human-generated rating. These
findings suggest that the use of PPCs is useful, as long
as they report reasonable ratings.
Participants’ reported trust in human-generated
and machine-generated ratings for PW6 (“aAaAaAaA”),
which has identical human-generated and machine-
generated ratings, shows that a significant portion of
(25%) participants had a good level of trust in experts’
judgments (comparable with participants who trusted
machine-generated ratings more readily – 27%). This
can be a sign of the usefulness of having real experts’
password strength ratings in PPCs.
5.4. Demographic Factors
We did not observe any significant influence of
demographic factors (gender, age and skill level)
on users’ trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings. This did not confirm Hypothesis H4.
For gender and skills, this may be linked to the effect of
an unbalanced sample, which is one of the limitations
of this study.
5.5. Engagement of Participants
We would like to point out that many participants
changed their responses after seeing the passwords,
which suggests that they were actively engaged in the
user study. This could be seen as indirect evidence
that the observed changes are a reflection of behaviors
that could be observed also in real-world settings.
We acknowledge the natural limitations of using
crowdsourcing workers for conducting user studies
especially on the quality of data collected, but the
nature and some design elements of our study (simple
tasks that crowdsourcing workers could be motivated
to engage in without providing random responses) gave
us some level of confidence on the results we reported
in this paper. In the future, we hope to conduct an
even larger scale study with more passwords and more
crowdsourcing workers and also a medium-scaled lab-
based study to further validate the results in this paper.
6. Limitations
Our choice of passwords and their human-generated
and machine-generated ratings impose some limita-
tions. Although we attempted to select representative
passwords for the experiment, the number of pass-
words we used (6) is small. Using a larger set of
passwords would help reduce password selection biases
and produce more convincing evidence of the findings
reported. In addition, users’ trust can be influenced by
many factors [21, 22], which are not easy to control in a
single user study. These factors can include perception
of password strength ratings, password composition,
demographic factors, users’ brand loyalty (i.e., people
may trust the rating obtained from a specific well-
known password metric or from a trusted security
community), context of use, etc.
We mentioned above that the unbalanced password
rating differences was also expected to influence the
results. However, this issue seems to be difficult
to address in future research. The use of more
balanced human-generated and machine-generated
ratings might not be possible without using fictitious
password human-generated and machine-generated
ratings. If this is the case, it will contradict our goal to
use realistic passwords and maintain ecological validity.
Furthermore, the password strength ratings them-
selves might influence users’ perception. Therefore, we
have to consider this factor to analyze users’ behaviors
accurately. This requires determining an accurate eval-
uation of password strength. This may be hard to do for
both human-generated and machine-generated ratings
since machine-generated ratings are not well defined,
and “ground-truth” human-generated ratings need to
consider opinions of a large number of security experts.
As we mentioned above, the behavioral analysis of
the password display condition implies that it is more
likely that many (if not most) participants were well
engaged with the task. One question that needs to be
addressed, however, is whether participants who did
not change their answers for both password sessions
were actually engaged to show their their genuine
behaviors. Although there is a possibility of cheating,
there is no clue about the actual number of cheating
behaviors or misunderstandings of our questions. This
intrinsic problem could be attributed to the use of a
crowdsourcing platform, and future research is needed
to see if this issue can be studied with more evidence
about the level of engagement of each individual
participant.
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7. Future Work
Our study produced some surprising results. Particu-
larly, the lack of observed effects of demographic fac-
tors was unexpected. While we could speculate about
a number of possible explanations, the results imply
that users’ perceived trust and their knowledge on
passwords are more complicated than we expected.
The results may also be related to the limitations of
the crowdsourcing method itself, whereby the demo-
graphic information provided by participants may con-
tain much more noise than other more controlled set-
tings. The influence of demographic factors requires
further investigation.
Although the reported work is about password
strength ratings only, we also conducted a parallel
study on human-generated and machine-generated
privacy ratings of mobile apps. Our results showed that
participants’ collective behaviors differed from those
in the password case, which led us to believe that the
application context also matters.
Given the observation that a significant number of
participants chose to trust human-generated ratings
only, introducing semi-subjective ratings into PPCs
may be useful at least for some users. Such human-
generated ratings can be collected based on a human-
in-the-loop approach where experts, assuming that they
are trustworthy, are encouraged to submit their own
subjective ratings when they disagree with the pass-
word meter’s machine-generated ratings. The extracted
passwords features with their human-generated ratings
can be then used as useful training data to simulate
experts’ opinions on unknown passwords’ strength.
This approach can then help improve password meters
by fixing errors and producing more reliable machine-
generated ratings. Human-generated ratings can be
pooled in a way to keep only reliable ones from real
experts. One way to determine the expertise of new
users can be done through getting an acknowledgment
from other known or pre-acknowledged experts or legal
authorities. The approach can be used in combination
with machine-generated ratings to enhance user choices
of password. We would not underestimate the difficul-
ties of actually implementing the human-in-the-loop
idea, but this can lead to interesting future research on
an aspect the password research community has not yet
explored.
As a side outcome, this work also reports a study (the
first according to the best of our knowledge) on human
experts’ strength ratings on 21 passwords and the cate-
gories they belong to. The study produced unexpected
results that experts may be more conservative in rating
passwords than PPCs are. We plan to further investigate
this observed phenomenon in future work.
As a whole, more future research is needed to
accumulate more evidence on how users perceive
password strength ratings and PPCs and how they
choose what to trust. Particularly, considering the
limitations of any crowdsourcing based studies, we plan
to conduct more crowdsourcing-based studies and also
traditional lab-based studies to further validate the
results we reported in this paper. Such studies will
help the design and deployment of password checkers,
passwords policies, and password educational tools.
In future work, the difference between human-
generated and machine-generated ratings in users’ trust
in machine-generated and human-generated ratings
requires some special handling of the ratings used (e.g.,
we may have to use false human-generated ratings to
cover positive differences between human-generated
and machine-generated ratings).
8. Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper reports the first
study comparing users’ perceived trust on password
strength ratings given by automated algorithms (PPCs)
and human experts. Our main findings indicate that:
1) users’ trust in human-generated and machine-
generated ratings of password strength is heavily
influenced by users’ own subjective judgments; 2) users
behave differently for different passwords; 3) there are
different behavioral patterns that can strongly influence
users’ decisions; 4) users have a (slightly) higher
tendency to trust machine-generated ratings when
their own subjective judgments match the machine-
generated ratings. We hope that this reported work can
stimulate more research into this less investigated area
of password research.
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Appendix A. Predefined Reasons
Here, we list the list of predefined reasons which depend on
the user’s choice of rating.
If a user selected “objective rating”, he or she saw the
following options of reasons.
1. Software can detect hidden things which users cannot.
2. Users often tend to make mistakes while software is
more accurate.
3. I do not trust subjective rating as I think not all users
have a good experience in the field.
4. I selected that rating because it matches my expecta-
tion.
5. I selected the lower rating to be safe.
6. I used my own experience/knowledge to make a
judgment.
7. Others.
If a user selected “subjective rating”, he or she saw the
following options of reasons.
1. I trust users because software cannot predict new form
of attacks.
2. Applications are created by human, so it is better to
trust user rating.
3. I think software can produce a misleading rating since
software might be compromised or not designed well.
4. I selected that rating because it matches my expecta-
tion.
5. I selected the lower rating to be safe.
6. I used my own experience/knowledge to make a
judgment.
7. Others.
If a user selected “neither”, he or she saw the following
options of reasons.
1. None of the two ratings match my expectation.
2. I consider both options in addition to my experience to
form my own rating.
3. Others.
If a user selected “undecided”, he or she saw the following
options of reasons.
1. I need more details to make a proper decision.
2. Others.
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